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Scholars of British politics agree that there has been a decline in formal political 
participation but disagree about its causes. On the one hand, some scholars cite ‘demand’ 
factors. Flinders argues that citizens need to modify their expectations about what politics 
can achieve and stop thinking the worst of politicians. Others, such as Hay and Richards, 
think the problem is based on ‘supply’: the inadequacy of the type of politics on offer. This 
paper uses the Scottish independence referendum as a test of these two competing 
explanations. The referendum campaign involved high levels of political engagement and 
resulted in an 85% turnout – a turnout considerably higher than recent elections to the UK 
(65%) and Scottish (50%) Parliaments. Does this offer lessons for the rest of the UK or was 
this a one-off event based on unique circumstances? Did the referendum process create 
overly high expectations about what can be achieved in terms of public involvement in a 
representative democracy like Scotland and the UK? For elections where salience is lower 
and the questions are more complicated, it is not clear that the high level of turnout seen in 
the referendum can be maintained. If large numbers of citizens feel their participation 
matters only in the context of referendums rather than elections, then this has implications 
for the quality of democracy. We conclude that the terms of political ‘supply’ changed, but 
also that people demanded information beyond that provided by the parties. Overall, this 
highlights the tension between a ‘clean’ referendum result and the messiness of 
representative politics mediated through parties. 
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Introduction 
There is a disagreement amongst scholars about the causes of the decline in formal political 
participation in the UK. Whilst all agree that there is a problem to be addressed, they differ 
in their interpretation of the diagnosis and the appropriate remedies. For Flinders (2012), 
the heart of the problem is citizens’ attitudes to democracy (primarily a ‘demand-side’ 
explanation); for Hay (2007), the problem lies in the political system itself (primarily a 
‘supply-side’ explanation’). In this paper we seek to use these two broad perspectives to 
analyse the referendum experience in Scotland. Most politicians and commentators agreed 
that Scotland had a ‘good’ referendum campaign, involving high levels of public 
engagement and deliberation. But what exactly changed in Scotland during this period? We 
use the literature on the decline in participation in the UK to try to shed some light on 
whether there was primarily a change in the political ‘supply’ (the way politics was 
conducted) or political ‘demand’ (citizens’ views about politics) or a mixture of both. We 
also consider whether there are any wider lessons about citizen engagement from 
Scotland’s referendum experience. 
 
First, we review the literature on citizen disengagement in the UK. We outline the two 
broad perspectives of ‘supply’ and ‘demand’. Do citizens need to change or does the 
system need to change? There is clearly some disagreement about the nature of the decline 
in formal political participation. However, we find that both of these explanations converge 
in their critique of the damage caused by depoliticisation and the encroachment of the logic 
of the market into political processes. Second, we consider the referendum campaign in 
Scotland using the analytical lenses of ‘supply’ and ‘demand’. Did the high turnout result 
from solving a demand-side issue or a supply-side issue, or perhaps both? Did people 
become more engaged because they changed their view about what politics could achieve 
or because the manner of doing politics changed during the referendum? Finally, we ask 
whether there are any lessons for the UK from the Scottish referendum campaign. 
 
We conclude that explanations for the high turnout and engagement in the Scottish 
referendum process are likely to involve a mixture of supply and demand perspectives. At 
its heart, we argue that the referendum involved a repoliticisation (Hay, 2013) of 
fundamental questions about the nature of government that are normally obscured by 
valence politics. The discussion of the creation of a new state opened up profound 
ideological debates about what is the ‘good society’. This makes the idea of ‘lessons for the 
UK’ problematic and certainly does not provide support for the use of more referendums. 
 
Perspectives on ‘Anti-Politics’: Supply or Demand? 
Most scholars writing about British politics agree that there is a problem of formal political 
participation (Stoker, 2006; Hay, 2007; Riddell, 2011; Flinders, 2012). This also applies to 
political participation in Scotland in recent years (but see Henderson and McEwen, 2010). 
However, whilst there is broad agreement about the existence of a problem, there are 
diverging views about its causes. These may broadly be classified as ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ 
explanations1. Those adhering to a supply side explanation argue that the political system 
needs to change fundamentally to re-engage disaffected citizens. Those who advocate a 
demand side explanation argue that citizens’ expectations need to be modified to take into 
account the difficulties and achievements of the democratic process. However, it is also the 
case that both perspectives converge in their emphasis on the problem of depoliticisation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We are acutely aware that distinction is not unproblematic (see, Hay, 2007: 158-160). We use it here simply 
as a device to group competing explanations. 
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and the dominance of the logic of the market in political processes. We explore these two 
perspectives below. 
 
Demand Side Explanations: ‘People need to change’ 
The demand side explanation focuses on citizens’ expectations of democratic government 
in the twenty-first century. For Riddell (2011: 3), ‘voters have unrealistic beliefs and hopes 
about what the political system can deliver for them.’ Voters’ perception of themselves as 
‘citizen consumers’ presents fundamental difficulties because the democratic process 
necessarily means that you cannot get what you want all of the time (Bale et al., 2006). 
Thus, as Flinders (2012: vii) argues: 
 
If we face a problem of political disconnection, we need to rebuild 
a set of authentic political relationships that focus not just on the 
responsibility and behaviour of politicians but also involve the 
expectations of all political actors, including the public. At the 
heart of this authentic relationship must also be a large dose of 
realism about the limits of democratic politics… 
 
In short, people get the politicians they deserve (Bentley, 2005). From this perspective, 
therefore, efforts to increase opportunities for citizens to participate are unlikely to solve 
the problem of disengagement from politics. The evidence about citizens’ desire to have a 
greater say in decision-making must be treated with caution. McHugh (2006: 550) argues 
that ‘new methods of direct engagement will fail to significantly increase activism amongst 
the overwhelming majority—no matter how frustrated they presently claim to be’. Instead, 
creating new participation opportunities is likely simply to encourage more engagement 
from the same middle class professionals who currently vote in elections (see also Mutz, 
2006). 
  
It follows that the policy response to declining participation must concentrate on voter and 
citizen education, rather than any fundamental change to the democratic institutions of the 
UK (McHugh, 2006: 551). As Riddell (2011: 101-102) explains, ‘Participatory democracy 
has attractions at a local, neighbourhood level, but not nationally in reconciling preferences 
and pressures on public spending, taxation and borrowing. That job is for politicians elected 
by, and acting on behalf of, all the people.’ The problem of participation is primarily to do 
with citizens’ attitudes, rather than the inadequacy of political institutions (although there is 
some scope for reforming these institutions to make them more open and transparent). 
 
Supply Side Explanations: ‘The system needs to change’ 
Another group of scholars disputes the idea that voters are to blame for the decline in 
participation. Instead, the system needs to change. Richards (2014: 30) argues that it is far 
from clear that the British public has an exaggerated sense of what government should do. 
Instead, he suggests that, in keeping with the dominance of Thaterchite economic 
arguments, British people actually expect the state to do less. Thus, as Whiteley (2012: 29) 
concludes: ‘Over a period of years the UK population has grown more conservative in 
feeling that government should do less.’ For instance, the percentage of people who expect 
that government should definitely ‘provide a job for everyone who wants one’ declined 
from 38 per cent in 1985 to 11 per cent in 2006. Similarly, the percentage of people who 
think that the state should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed declined 
from 45 per cent in 1985 to 11 per cent in 2006 (Whiteley, 2012: 12). 
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Instead of changing attitudes, those who argue for a supply-side explanation emphasise the 
need to change the UK’s political processes. As Hay (2007: 45) argues: 
 
For even if it could be shown definitively that levels of social 
capital and political trust were correlated…why should we see the 
relationship as causal, and why should we see the lines of 
correlation running one way rather than the other? Put slightly 
differently, to settle for an explanation of changing patterns in 
political participation in terms of variations in the level of social 
capital begs as many questions as it answers… 
 
For Richards (2014: 37) recognising this fact means considering a fundamental reappraisal 
of the British Political Tradition and the Westminster Model of British governance: 
 
The diagnosis then for the issues raised…concerning a second-
wave crisis of expectation is that one should, in the first place, 
preference reform to the supply of politics. Crucially this requires 
willingness by the political class to abandon the British Political 
Tradition and instead seek out a smarter democracy appropriate for 
the 21st century emphasising much greater deliberation and 
participation. 
 
Disenchantment with politics, according to this perspective, is justified. Educating people 
more about or tinkering with the present system will merely result in further alienation and 
the preservation of a system with nineteenth-century origins that is long past due for 
reform. 
 
Table 1: Summary of academic arguments about British political participation 
 
Demand Supply 
People have unrealistic expectations 
about what democratic government can 
achieve. 
 
People’s expectations are not the source 
of the problem: the system cannot meet 
their reasonable demands. 
People’s cynicism about politics is 
inflated and in many cases unjustified. 
The present system needs to be explained 
and communicated better. 
 
People can feel legitimately aggrieved 
that the political system is not working 
for them and needs to change more 
fundamentally than a demand-side 
explanation suggests. 
 
Increased participation opportunities are 
likely to dilute accountability, disappoint 
and involve the same middle class people 
who currently vote. 
Increased participation opportunities and 
a recasting of the British Political 
Tradition offer a reasonable chance of 
improving the political system. 
 
Depoliticisation and the Logic of the Market 
However, both of these perspectives converge when they discuss the importance of 
depoliticisation as a central component of an explanation of participation. Whilst Flinders 
(2012) and Hay (2007) come to quite different conclusions, they both emphasise the 
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pernicious effects of depoliticisation and the encroachment of market-based processes into 
politics.  
 
For Flinders (2012: 90): 
 
Depoliticization rarely brings power closer to the general public 
and is more accurately viewed as the transfer of power between 
competing elites. Put slightly differently, depoliticization represents 
the denial of democratic capacity and the narrowing or infolding of 
the public sphere. 
 
Hay links processes of depoliticisation to the unthinking acceptance of the main tenets of 
public choice theory among political elites. Thus: 
 
There is a very real sense in which formal politics is diminished 
both by the admission (if that is what it is) of political incapacity on 
the part of politicians and the institutional depoliticization that 
follows from this (Hay, 2007: 94). 
 
In both of these perspectives, depoliticisation serves to remove decision-making from the 
democractic arena and place it out of the hands of politicians. It therefore both signals a 
lack of faith in politics (where decisions might be short term, populist or prone to capture 
by special interests) and suggests that formal political participation matters less when 
technocratic considerations are emphasised over deliberation. 
 
Referendums and the Democratic Process 
Referendums are the clearest examples of direct democracy in use in contemporary 
representative democracies, and their use has become widespread (Butler and Ranney, 
1994).  For some, this increase in use can be explained with reference to the negative role 
of the people in representative democracies – that is, the power of the people is limited to 
selecting and de-selecting their preferred representatives in elections (Bogdanor, 1994).  
For others, it is a question of increasing the legitimacy of a particular course of action – if 
the people vote for it, it appears to have more legitimacy (Papadopoulous, 2001).  For 
Qvortrup, referendums are “a supplement to indirect democracy”, giving the public the 
deciding vote and an opportunity to take democracy closer to the “ideal of government by 
discussion” than whipped votes along party lines in contemporary representative 
democracies (Qvortrup, 2005).  However, Chambers argues that the polarisation of debate 
in referendums and the inevitability of majoritarian outcomes actually “derails deliberation 
and, in so doing, undermines the legitimacy of outcomes”.  Indeed, this goes as far as 
seeing voting in a referendum as “final” and citing referendums as a “zero-sum game” 
(Chambers, 2001: 240-5).  LeDuc’s (2003) criticism goes further, noting that referendums 
are often susceptible to “insufficient information, confusing question wording, or 
contradictory lines of argument regarding the possible consequences of a referendum vote”.  
Tierney (2012) points out that referendums in the context of representative democracies are 
problematic, potentially anti-democratic, and may not be the most appropriate means of 
directly engaging the public in political (and especially, constitutional) discussions. 
 
The UK House of Lords appointed its Select Committee on the Constitution to investigate 
“the role of referendums in the UK’s constitutional experience”.  The report examined a 
range of evidence in favour of continuing, expanding or formalising the use of referendums 
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in the UK.  Reasons to do so included: settling an issue; enhancing citizen engagement; 
promoting voter education; safeguarding the parliament or government from controversial 
decisions; the fact that when the public make their position known in a referendum that 
position is difficult to reverse; and that the referendum is a compliment to representative 
democracy as practised in the UK (House of Lords, 2010).  Against that, they heard 
evidence that referendums were simply tactical devices; that the campaigns were dominated 
by elite groups; had a damaging impact on minority groups; are a block on progress; do not 
settle an issue; tend not to be about the issue in question; are costly; and, in fact, undermine 
representative democracy.  They concluded that while they held particular criticism for the 
ad hoc nature of referendums – specifically, their use as tactical devices – there was a place 
for referendums in the UK, and that place was most appropriately in dealing with 
“fundamental constitutional issues” such as changing the electoral system for the House of 
Commons or matters of national secession from the Union.  The Scottish referendum fits 
into this criterion, and the engagement by the electorate in the process provides evidence of 
some of the committee’s evidence.  In particular, the clarity and binary nature of the 
question, the salience of the issue, and the use of a referendum as the means to determine 
the issue are factors which would point towards increased levels of public engagement on 
the question. 
 
Analytical Framework for Scotland 
We want to use the literature on participation to try to shed some light on the nature of the 
referendum process in Scotland. From this literature, we draw three broad possible 
perspectives on the high political engagement in the Scottish referendum process: 
 
1. The high political engagement can mainly be accounted for by a 
demand side explanation: people temporarily changed their expectations 
about what politics could achieve. Thus, the high salience of the question 
was a major factor in the high turnout. 
 
2. The high political engagement can mainly be accounted for by a 
supply side explanation: the way politics was conducted changed during 
the referendum process. There was a temporary shift away from normal 
processes in the way politics was conducted during the campaigns. 
 
3. The high political engagement cannot be accounted for unless we use a 
mixture of both supply and demand perspectives. 
 
This provides two broad analytical lenses through which to isolate and explore in detail 
aspects of the Scottish referendum debate. All of these perspectives beg questions about 
how far this experience is sustainable in Scotland and perhaps replicable in the rest of the 
UK or elsewhere. 
 
Political participation during the referendum 
In 1951, 2.9 million people in the UK were members of the Conservative and Unionist 
Party, with another 876,000 members of the Labour Party.  The electoral turnout was 
83.9% and between them the two large parties took a 96% share of the vote and 616 of the 
625 seats in the House of Commons.  By 2011, membership of the parties was significantly 
reduced: the Conservatives had fallen to 177,00, with Labour succeeding them as the 
largest party by membership, with around 190,000 members.  The General Election turnout 
in 2010 was 65% and, while the combined Conservative and Labour vote had only reduced 
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to 87%, they now only commanded 564 of the 650 seats in the House of Commons.  The 
polls for the General Election in May 2015 suggest that not only will the turnout continue 
to sit around the 65% mark, but that the combined total of Conservative and Labour votes 
and seats will continue to fall markedly. 
 
All of this stands in stark contrast to the level of engagement in and with the Scottish 
independence referendum in September 2014.  Here, 97% of those eligible to do so 
registered to vote, and the turnout in the event itself was a Scottish-record 84.6%.  But the 
numbers here do not do justice to the democratic success of the independence referendum.  
Town hall meetings were packed, previously un-engaged citizens gave up their evenings 
and weekends to campaign and you couldn’t enter a pub, shop or taxi without someone 
mentioning the referendum.  After the results were counted and Scotland’s place was 
secured in the UK (at least for the foreseeable future), many of those re-engaged activists 
decided to remain involved, joining political parties – predominantly, those that had 
campaign in favour of independence. 
 
The Scottish independence referendum actively engaged the electorate in political 
discussion for almost the entire duration of the ‘long’ campaign.  From the point the 
referendum date was declared by First Minister Alex Salmond, supporters of both 
independence and the Union mobilised.  The referendum was governed by the Scottish 
Independence Referendum Act (2013), which included slight variations to the rules set out 
in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (2000), and was overseen by the 
Electoral Commission.  The rules allowed for the two designated campaign organisations – 
Yes Scotland and Better Together – to spend up to £1.5m each, which necessitated 
accounting returns to be done at a national rather than local level.  In addition, the Scottish 
political parties were given spending limits based upon their performance in the 2011 
Scottish Parliamentary election.  Given that the SNP (£1.34m) and the Greens (£150,000) 
were campaigning for a Yes vote while Labour (£834,000), the Conservatives (£396,000) 
and the Liberal Democrats (201,000 were campaigning for a No vote, by fortunate 
coincidence the limit for parties campaigning on both sides was nearly the same: just shy of 
£1.5m, in addition to the £1.5m available to the designated campaign organisations.  Non-
party organisations and individuals could and did register with the Electoral Commission, 
with a limit on their spending of £150,000.  Again, coincidentally, the number of 
organisations and individuals registered was the same (21) for both outcomes (Electoral 
Commission, 2014).   
 
Placing limitations on what parties and non-party actors could spend during the referendum 
campaign was intended to widen the participation in the process beyond the ‘usual 
suspects’ of party members, and this objective achieved a measure of success.  National 
organisations in favour of each option – Yes Scotland and Better Together – were 
established in May and June 2012 respectively.  However, those organisations were only 
the beginning of the story in terms of activism during the referendum.  This was 
particularly true of Yes Scotland.  While at the national level the campaign was led by 
former journalist Blair Jenkins and Dennis Canavan, former MSP, the organisation was 
comprised of a network of local Yes campaign groups.  These groups operated with much 
in the way of autonomy, relying only on the national organisation for campaign materials 
and media support.  But there were also a plethora of campaign groups involved – on both 
sides – which had no formal ties with the official campaign organisations (see table 1.2). 
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Table 2 
 
Yes outcome No outcome 
1001 campaign Better Together 2012 Ltd 
Business for Scotland Ltd Better With Scotland 
Christians for Independence Britannica 
English Democrats Communication Workers Union (CWU) 
Farming 4 Yes Conservative Party 
Generation Yes Cumbria Broadband Rural and Community 
Projects Limited 
Labour for Independence GMB 
Mr Tommy Sheppard Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland 
Mrs Sarah-Louise Bailey-Kelly Labour Party 
National Collective Let’s Stay Together 
Radical Independence Campaign Liberal Democrats 
Scottish CND Mr Alistair McConnachie 
Scottish Green Party Mr Angus MacDonald 
Scottish Independence Convention Mr Ghill Donald 
Scottish National Party Mr Tony George Stevenson 
Scottish Socialist Party No Borders Campaign 
Spirit of Independence Scottish Jacobite Party 
Wealthy Nation Stirlingshire For No Thanks 
Wings Over Scotland The Scottish Research Society 
Women for Independence Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied 
Workers (USDAW) 
Yes Scotland Limited WFS2014 Ltd 
Source: Electoral Commission (2014) 
 
 
Clearly, political parties were involved at the heart of the referendum process, registering 
and taking an active role in campaign groups.  But beyond the parties, other sectoral and 
interest groups, as well as individuals, organised themselves to campaign for both 
outcomes.  On the ‘Yes’ side, the spectrum of interests and viewpoints was immediately 
apparent.  Business for Scotland and Wealthy Nation provided a centre-right perspective of 
independence, arguing for lower taxes, economic liberty and self-reliance.  This contrasted 
sharply with the Radical Independence Campaign’s egalitarian positioning.  Women for 
Independence – one of the Yes campaign’s most prominent organisations – concentrated on 
issues of gender equality and social justice, and sought to increase political engagement 
among women.  Generation Yes similarly saw constitutional change as an opportunity to 
alter the political and institutional setting to deliver beneficial change to Scotland’s young 
people.  National Collective brought together artists, writers and musicians, arguing that the 
‘ultimate creative act – creating a new nation’ would deliver opportunities for change.  The 
Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament also saw independence as an opportunity, in 
their case, an opportunity to remove nuclear weapons from Scotland.  In many ways, the 
disparate campaign groups served to highlight the inherent contradictions at the heart of the 
campaign for independence – that the ambitions and desires of each of the campaign groups 
could not all be delivered, since some of them directly contradicted others.  However, the 
‘everything to everyone’ nature of the Yes campaign in particular served to engage the 
public and widened the debate from a narrow focus on the constitutional settlement to a 
broader, multi-faceted discussion. 
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The decision to allow 16 and 17 year olds to vote in the referendum also helped to boost 
engagement levels, and increased the record electorate for an election or referendum in 
Scotland to 4,283,938 (Electoral Commission, 2014).  With an estimated 4.41m people in 
Scotland over the age of 16 eligible to register (according to 2012 figures released by the 
Scottish Government), this meant that approximately 97% of those who could register to 
vote did so.  This represented an increase of some 300,000 on the registrations for the 2010 
UK General Election in Scotland.  Around 109,000 of those registrations can be accounted 
for with the addition of 16 and 17 year olds – 89% of whom registered to vote for the first 
time.  The evidence here is clear: excluding the 16 and 17 year olds who had no been 
permitted to register previously, close to 200,000 voters who had not been registered to 
vote previously did so for the referendum.  When it came to the referendum itself, 84.6% of 
the electorate – 3,623,344 of those registered – turned out to vote, representing a significant 
increase in turnout on the 2010 UK General Election in Scotland (63.8%) and the 2011 
Scottish Parliament election (50.4%). 
 
The Electoral Reform Society Scotland’s ‘Democracy Max’ programme attempted to 
engage the public in considering how best Scotland’s political system might operate, 
irrespective of the constitutional question.  Indeed, they asked attendees at a special 
conference to consider the following hypothetical question: “It's 2030, and Scotland is 
admired as a shining example of democracy and democratic participation. What three 
aspects of this future society please you most?” (Electoral Reform Society, 2013).  The 
suggestions focused both on the expectations of the electorate and the potential changes to 
the institutional setting which would allow further public engagement.  Three themes were 
identified: the sovereignty of the people (empowering and engaging the citizenry); 
defending our democracy (limited the influence of vested interests); and writing the rules 
(improving checks and balances in the democratic system).  Broadly speaking, the 
suggestions made by the public engaged in this process fell into the two categories we 
identify as relevant to altered public engagement in the referendum process: supply and 
demand factors.  Here, however, there is a clear suggestion that if supply factors are altered 
– such as providing more in the way of local democracy, accountability, openness and 
transparency – the expectations of the public will be altered too, thereby reducing apathy 
and increasing the perception that engagement with the system has some kind of outcome.  
The Electoral Reform Society suggest that the current system of politics is the main barrier 
to public engagement, and that if structures were altered, expectations would also be better 
able to be delivered.  Herein, evidence that the instant gratification of a referendum vote 
and outcome had a direct impact upon the electorate’s perception that their vote counted for 
something. 
 
Explaining the level of engagement 
With regards to our perspectives explaining the high political engagement during the 
referendum campaign, both supply and demand side factors appear to have been important 
in raising involvement with the local and national campaigns.  On the one hand the salience 
of the issue led many to attach higher expectations to the potential outcomes.  As we have 
seen from the nature of the disparate Yes campaign organisations, some of these 
expectations were in direct competition with the expectations of other Yes activists.  
Naturally, the expectation of being able to deliver upon a preferred outcome gives impetus 
to those not normally motivated to do so to become active on an issue and attempt to 
convince others of the merits of their argument.  However, on the other hand, there is clear 
evidence that there were attempts made to move the debate away from the political elites 
and into wider society, engaging beyond the usual suspects.  Thus, it became a campaign 
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like no other: political parties were not the only actors involved in campaigning, local town 
hall debates were well-attended – and, arguably, more important than set-piece debates on 
national television – and the electorate was very aware that a campaign was ongoing. 
 
From the referendum campaign we can identify three ways in which supply and demand 
changes affected the electorate’s engagement with politics.  In terms of supply factors, the 
distillation of politics to one single issue – a six-word question on the constitutional future 
of Scotland – limited the breadth of politics.  It created a binary issue, one which parties 
united to support or oppose.  While parties remained the dominant actors in the political 
process, the debate became less overtly party political, with parties which have historically 
competed against each other working together to support a common goal.  Second, as a 
result of the temporary lull in partisan hostilities, the public were more inclined to involve 
themselves in the debate, and in political activism.  This seemed, in many cases, to help 
overcome the decline in party memberships and provided the umbrella organisations Yes 
Scotland and Better Together with ‘boots on the ground’, activists to canvass, deliver 
leaflets and provide a visible emphasis of support for their constitutional position.  
Moreover, the organisation of events at a grass-roots level helped to bring the debate to a 
more local level, removing perceived distance between political decision-making at elite 
level and the impact upon the electorate.  The closeness of opinion polls also helped to 
encourage activists to campaign right up to the close of polls on 18 September – as a binary 
issue decided by a straight majority vote, there was no requirement for tactical voting.  
Third, organisations which were not necessarily overtly party political sought to involve 
themselves in the campaign, either by providing information on a neutral basis, or by 
aligning with one option or the other.  As we can see from the table above, organisations 
such as the Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland and the Communications Workers Union 
aligned themselves with those campaigning for a No vote, while the Scottish Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament and the English Democrats supported a Yes vote.  The focus for 
these organisations was which constitutional option best helped advance their own 
objectives.  Beyond those organisations, local community councils and churches arranged 
hustings events in order to help provide (neutral) information to their local electorates.  The 
effect of these three factors was a repoliticisation of issues.  Hay’s (2013, 113) argument 
about depoliticisation is relevant here.  He argues that ‘big politics’ is 
 
a showcase public spectacle which confirms all of our worst 
suspicions, reinforcing the very cynicism which we have been 
encouraged to see as crucial to defending our liberties from the 
roguish knaves who would claim to represent us. 
 
However, the referendum campaign did something different.  Rather than taking issues 
away from the public, politicians opened up the constitutional question and allowed the 
public to partake in the debate.  As Hay argues, ‘to politicize something – to render it 
political – is to bring it in to the realm of contingency and to create the possibility of 
subjecting it to human purpose and intention’ (2013: 109).  For a short period of time, the 
constitutional question, and the politics surrounding it, was outwith the control of the 
political elites and in the hands of the public.   
 
Crucially, it also presented the opportunity to discuss issues that are normally placed off 
limits by processes of depoliticisation and the day-to-day valence politics of the UK. Thus, 
in addition to more mundane questions about the availability of the BBC and the location of 
the Passport Office, the campaign focused on fundamental questions about the state and 
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about the type of society Scottish people wanted to live in. Quite simply, general elections 
are not normally focused on these questions. What currency should Scotland have? Should 
it be a member of the European Union? Should the state attempt to fundamentally change 
the economy to make it more like that of some of the Nordic countries? Should it 
unilaterally remove nuclear weapons from its soil? In short, much of the campaign focused, 
uniquely, on the process of creating a new state. Although the logic of the market did enter 
into the campaign when some participants argued that it precluded a more ambitious 
reimagining of the Scottish state, this did not prevent mainstream discussion of profoundly 
ideological and political questions. The Big Issues were temporarily repoliticised. 
 
At the same time, demand factors also played a considerable role in engaging the electorate 
in the debate.  The repoliticisation of the constitutional question, the requirement for the 
public to make a considered judgement on whether or not Scotland should become an 
independent country created a demand for information.  This required not only more 
political activism-to-electorate engagement, requiring elected representatives to spend more 
time with voters discussing the potential implications of the referendum but also required 
those who desired information to be more active in seeking it out.  This was a distinct 
change in electorate attitude: during election campaigns votes often go out of their way to 
avoid political contact, but here, with the impression that their vote would ‘matter’, they 
were keen to become informed and make their decision based upon that informed choice.  
This manifested itself not only in engagement on the doorstep but also in an increase in 
demand for public events.  The public meeting made a return to Scottish politics, with the 
demand for town hall meetings and public information events in some cases outstripping 
the supply.  At a town hall hustings one of the authors attended in Ellon, Aberdeenshire, 
community council members expected around 50 people to attend.  They ran out of chairs 
when over 150 arrived to hear the debate – with more standing at the back of the hall.  
Anecdotally, this is a story which was replicated across the country: the public were 
engaged, they wanted to know what their vote meant and what difference it would make.  
Balancing this, there was still a scepticism with politics, and particularly, a distrust of 
politicians, but this was overcome by a belief that – in this instance at least – their vote 
mattered, and that it could deliver some kind of change.  
 
In the aftermath of the referendum, parties across the political spectrum saw an upturn in 
membership evidence that the electorate who had gotten involved in September remained 
engaged in the political process and are eager to have their voice heard.  The increase in 
membership among those parties which supported independence, however, is markedly 
more than those which supported the union.  Indeed, the SNP recently announced their 
membership had passed 100,000 members – meaning approximately 0.2% of the Scottish 
population are members of the party.  What does it tell us that supporters of independence 
remain disproportionately engaged in the political process?  Partly, there’s a reaction to 
outgoing First Minister Alex Salmond’s prophecy that ‘The Dream Shall Never Die’ 
(Salmond, 2015), a recognition that if such a constitutional change is desired then it 
requires political activism to deliver it.  It’s also partly a restatement of the desire for 
change which was evident in the referendum campaign, and a restatement of activists’ 
commitment to try to deliver it.  But we might also read into it that the prior low 
expectations of politics may have been somewhat tempered by expectation that only by 
engaging in political activism through party membership can things be changed.  This 
suggests that some of the confidence in the political system has returned – and particularly, 
that there is an expectation that political activism can have an impact. 
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However, just last month, a TNS Scotland poll suggested that just 64% are “certain to vote” 
in May’s General Election, a figure roughly the same as the last election 5 years ago, and a 
considerable fall from the referendum turnout.  So why, when political interest appears 
higher than it has been for decades, are people still reluctant to vote?  Academics have long 
considered the Scottish electorate to be rather sophisticated, clearly distinguishing between 
different levels of election and electoral systems, and voting accordingly.  It is clear too that 
the Scottish electorate is also distinguishing between the potential outcome of a stand-alone 
example of direct democracy and the run of the mill, business-as-usual politics of a general 
election.  The former sees expectations raised; the immediacy of a decision made and 
delivered.  The latter delegates decision-making to representatives in a parliament far 
removed from the individual.   
 
Lessons from Scotland’s Experience? 
It is a mixture of both supply and demand explanations and it occurred at a specific place 
and time. This makes it difficult to replicate in the rest of the UK.  We know that lots of 
individual referendums on public policy issues are not the answer (House of Lords, 2010).  
We also know not to adopt the ‘build it and they will come’ attitude of the Power Inquiry 
(Mutz, 2008). This experience is unlikely to be replicated through ‘democracy hubs’.  It 
seems that, without the immediacy of clear outcome or the salience of a constitutional 
question in a referendum, voters see less at stake in a ‘normal’ election when party politics 
takes centre stage. 
 
What can we learn from the referendum?  The electorate are engaged, and they want to be 
involved in political decisions.  They expect much from their political representatives.  
However, those expectations seem to be tempered by a general apathy with the system of 
representative politics that exists at Westminster (and, based on turnout figures, Holyrood, 
Brussels and local government as well).  To that end, there are both supply and demand 
explanations for engagement in the referendum process, and that engagement being 
significantly reduced for elections.  This suggests that both require changes: the system 
itself needs altered, in part to account for the increased plurality of options at the ballot box; 
while the expectation of what can be achieved through political engagement also requires 
modified to consider the challenges inherent in representative democracy. 
 
The context of electoral politics in the UK has altered significantly in the devolution period.  
Not only do we now have multi-level governance, with different parties in power and in 
opposition at state, regional and local level, but we are now seeing parties which hitherto 
have played a limited role at the state level bringing influence to bear.  The UK electorate 
delivered a hung parliament and a coalition government in 2010, and looks likely to repeat 
this outcome in May 2015.  The erosion of the two-party politics of old and the rise in 
support for parties outside of the ‘establishment’ suggests that the influence of public 
engagement with politics is altering the political dynamic of the UK.  The evidence of 
public engagement with the Scottish independence referendum suggests that there is an 
appetite for politics, but that it may require specific circumstances in order to engage the 
electorate in the process.  In this sense, moves towards participatory democracy and wider 
party representation in the political system seems to be a result of supply and demand 
factors.  The public appear to remain sceptical about the institutional setting and their 
ability to affect change, but if representative politics reacts more broadly to the lessons of 
engagement in the referendum, there might be scope to retain some of that engagement 
with politics more broadly. 
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Conclusion: Repoliticisation 
As David Melding (2013: 6) argues, the Scots in 2014 were asked to perform a ‘fiduciary 
duty of the highest order’. The consensus among politicians and commentators appears to 
be that, on the whole, the process was a positive one and generated a debate worthy of the 
question. This optimistic assessment and the high turnout is in contrast to much more 
depressing analyses of formal political engagement in the UK. We therefore sought to 
assess the reasons for the ‘success’ of Scotland’s referendum using two broad perspectives 
adapted from the literature on the decline of political engagement in the UK: viewing it 
through the lenses of political ‘supply’ and political ‘demand’. 
 
We conclude that during the campaign, both the supply and demand elements of politics 
changed. Voters demanded more information and were inspired to involve themselves in 
grassroots campaigns. At the same time, new avenues for political participation opened 
beyond the political parties (in the two campaigns) and the immediacy and impact of the 
question suggested a change from the more complicated and indirect form of representative 
democracy. We suggest that the overarching explanation for this change can be found in the 
repoliticisation of issues that are normally removed from the political agenda.  Lessons for 
the UK are more difficult because representative politics is inherently messier than a clear-
cut referendum and it is difficult to repoliticise issues outside the context of the creation of 
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